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I. INTRODUCTION
Citizens blinded by pepper spray during a peaceful protest, fired
unceremoniously from their jobs for political reasons, or denied access to the
ballot box based on the color of their skin often rest their hopes for
remediation on 42 U.S.C. § 1983. That statutory provision imposes liability
for constitutional violations perpetrated by government actors, allowing
plaintiffs to seek monetary damages and declaratory and injunctive relief
from the individual officers who violated their rights.
While the Supreme Court has sanctioned § 1983 as a device for
plaintiffs' recovery, it has also expressed reservations about imposing
financial liability on government officers. Officers may encounter an
incentive not to act for fear of § 1983 liability or may unfairly face damages
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for their inability to predict whether their actions were constitutional.' TheCourt has therefore developed the doctrine of qualified immunity-which
imposes liability only if "it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his
conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted" 2
-and has created a
procedural framework for its implementation. Under this framework, "the
first inquiry must be whether a constitutional right would have been violated
on the facts alleged; second, assuming the violation is established, the
question whether the right was clearly established must be considered on a
more specific level."3 The Supreme Court first indicated a preference for
this ordering of the issues in Siegert v. Gilley, decided in 1991, 4 and then
made that approach mandatory in Saucier v. Katz, decided in 2001. 5 But in2009-a mere eight years after Saucier-the Court overruled that case in
Pearson v. Callahan, holding that the ordering of the issues should remain
discretionary rather than mandatory.6
Pearson's holding has, if anything, intensified the debate over theproper procedural framework for addressing qualified immunity claims.
Courts and commentators have justified the requirement that courts resolve
the constitutional question first-which I will refer to as the "sequencing"
approach-by asserting the need to clarify constitutional law. 7  If courts
repeatedly hold that a particular right is not clearly established, without ever
defining the contours of that right, then government actors may be able to
repeatedly engage in unconstitutional conduct without ever incurring
liability for their actions. Sequencing, the argument goes, is therefore
necessary for two reasons. First, it clarifies the law so that police officers
may avoid future violations if their conduct is held unconstitutional. And
second, it ensures that, in the future, a similarly-wronged plaintiff would be
able to recover if she had, in fact, suffered a violation of her constitutional
rights. Although authorities have suggested that the law may be clarified via
1. This concern for officers' willingness to act and financial security is somewhat misplacedgiven that the vast majority of jurisdictions have statutory indemnification provisions or offerindemnification to employees by policy or collective bargaining agreement. See, e.g.,Lawrence Rosenthal, A Theory of Governmental Damages Liability: Torts, Constitutional Torts, andTakings, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 797, 819 & n.89 (2007) (collecting commentary). Of course, suchindemnification merely shifts our concern for overdeterrence onto the government employer, which
may consequently train its employees to act with caution given its own potential financial liability.
See id. at 856-57.
2. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 202 (2001).
3. Id. at 200.
4. 500 U.S. 226 (1991).
5. 533 U.S. at 202.
6. 129 S. Ct. 808, 813 (2009).
7. See infra text accompanying notes 79-81.
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other mechanisms-suits for injunctive or declaratory relief, for example-
many areas of the law are not susceptible to such suits.'
The sequencing approach, however, has met with its share of criticism.
Sequencing requires courts to resolve difficult constitutional questions in
situations where, previously, they might simply have granted qualified
immunity on the ground that the relevant law was not clearly established.
From an efficiency standpoint, therefore, sequencing is costly, requiring
courts to allocate time and resources to deciding complex constitutional
questions. Moreover, sequencing risks premature and poorly reasoned
adjudication of these complex questions, particularly because the Supreme
Court has indicated that the qualified immunity issue should be resolved as
early in litigation as possible. Sequencing also creates a procedural
conundrum: where a government official receives an unfavorable
constitutional ruling but is granted qualified immunity, sequencing insulates
that unfavorable constitutional decision from appellate review because the
government is, technically, a prevailing party. Finally, as a jurisprudential
matter, sequencing contravenes the well-established and oft-quoted norm
favoring avoidance of unnecessary adjudication of constitutional questions.
Before Pearson, four sitting Justices explicitly questioned the wisdom of
sequencing on all these grounds, most vigorously Justice Breyer, who, in
2007, announced that if it were his choice he "would end the failed Saucier
experiment now." 9
No one, however, has yet addressed the empirical underpinnings of the
sequencing debate.'" Does sequencing in fact result in the clarification of
the scope of constitutional rights, as its proponents claim? And if so, has
8. For example, a plaintiff may lack standing to seek injunctive relief because he is unable to
show a reasonable probability of future injury. In City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 111
(1983), the Court held that an individual who was subjected to a choke hold during a traffic stop
could not sue for injunctive relief because he was unable to show that he would be choke held in the
future. Indeed, this problem permeates the Fourth Amendment excessive force context, where
plaintiffs injured in a particular situation are generally unable to show that a similar situation would
arise in the future. See Pamela S. Karlan, The Paradoxical Structure of Constitutional Litigation, 75
FORDHAM L. REV. 1913, 1917 (2007).
9. Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2642 (2007) (Breyer, J., concurring); see infra text
accompanying notes 40-78 for a discussion of other Justices' criticisms of Saucier.
10. See Rosenthal, supra note 1, at 859 n.241 ("I am unaware of any empirical evidence that the
doctrine of qualified immunity has operated to inhibit the development of constitutional law.").
While Professor Healy has compiled and categorized cases decided during the two years following
Saucier, his work examines only a single time frame and, therefore, cannot capture Saucier's effect
on the course of constitutional decision making. See Thomas Healy, The Rise of Unnecessary
Constitutional Rulings, 83 N.C. L. REv. 847, 930, app. (2005); see also infra notes 101-106 and
accompanying text (discussing in detail Healy's work and its limitations).
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such clarification resulted in the acknowledgement or denial of
constitutional rights? My paper therefore provides an empirical analysis of
the consequences of sequencing. Through the research presented here, I
sought to determine the results of the forced adjudication of constitutional
questions.
My methodology was straightforward. I examined a random sample of
federal district courts cases in which a qualified immunity defense was
raised during three time intervals: (1) the two years before Siegert, before
the Court had indicated any preference for sequencing; (2) the two years
before Saucier, before the Court had made clear that sequencing was
mandatory; and (3) the calendar years 2006 and 2007. I then did the same
for federal appellate cases within the same three time intervals.
My research yielded both expected and unexpected results. In the two
years before Siegert, courts avoided the constitutional question in over a
quarter of the cases in which the government officer raised a qualified
immunity defense. Unsurprisingly, given the Supreme Court's increasing
insistence on the sequencing approach, the likelihood of avoidance
decreased by half for cases decided in the two years before Saucier, and fell
below 5% in 2006 and 2007. We might expect this decrease in avoidance to
correspond to a relatively similar increase in the percentage of constitutional
questions decided for plaintiffs and for defendants-after all, the previously-
avoided constitutional questions are likely to be the difficult cases, where
courts preferred simply to grant immunity rather than grapple with the
constitutional issue. Surprisingly, this was not the case. The marked decline
in avoidance did not correspond to any statistically significant increase in the
recognition of new constitutional rights. Rather, the decline in avoidance
was accompanied only by a sharp increase in the percentage of cases in
which courts explicitly held that no constitutional violation had occurred.
My research therefore counters the argument that mandatory sequencing
is critical to remediating civil rights violations because it promotes the
articulation of new constitutional rights. To the contrary, my research shows
that mandatory sequencing does not correspond to any increase in the rate at
which courts find for plaintiffs in the qualified immunity context.
Sequencing leads to the articulation of more constitutional law, but not the
expansion of constitutional rights.
After explaining my research methodology and describing my findings
in detail, this article explores possible explanations for this phenomenon. I
contend that, given the longstanding norm within our legal system that
where there is a right, there must be a remedy, judges are deeply
uncomfortable with the notion of acknowledging a violation yet denying
relief. Cognitive psychology research supports this notion: judges are
reluctant to acknowledge a constitutional violation where they subsequently
intend to grant qualified immunity because such a result induces a state of
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psychological discomfort known as cognitive dissonance. In an effort to
avoid such dissonance, therefore, judges may-entirely unintentionally-
allow their beliefs about whether a government officer is entitled to qualified
immunity to influence their analysis of whether a constitutional violation
occurred at all. I then explore the long-term consequences for the
development of the law resulting from a mandatory sequencing approach.
As I was in the process of conducting the research presented in this
article, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Pearson v. Callahan, and sua
sponte requested that the parties brief whether Saucier should be
overruled. 1 After briefing and oral argument, a unanimous Court then held
that overruling was appropriate. 12 The empirical research I present supports
the Court's decision to overturn Saucier's mandatory sequencing regime, but
I believe that the judiciary would have been better served by a decision
providing more specific guidance to lower courts regarding when
sequencing is and is not appropriate. I will therefore also briefly describe an
approach that lower courts might adopt to determine whether they should
exercise their discretion to rule on the merits of a constitutional issue.
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF QUALIFIED IMMUNITY DOCTRINE
With 42 U.S.C. § 1983, enacted in 1871 as part of the Ku Klux Klan
Act,13 Congress created a civil damages remedy against any person acting
under color of state law who causes "the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution." A plaintiff who
demonstrates the deprivation of such a constitutional or statutory right,
however, may not be entitled to recovery if a defendant government official
proves himself eligible for qualified immunity, a judge-created doctrine that
excuses public officials from liability for illegal behavior if a reasonable
official would not have known that the behavior in question violated clearly
established law. As the Supreme Court explained in Pierson v. Ray, its first
enunciation of the qualified immunity doctrine, "a police officer is not
charged with predicting the future course of constitutional law."'
14
Therefore, with respect to the police officers sued for falsely arresting civil
rights demonstrators in Pierson, "if the jury found that the officers
reasonably believed in good faith that the arrest was constitutional, then a
11. 128 S. Ct. 1702 (2008).
12. Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808 (2009).
13. Ku Klux Klan Act, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13(1871).
14. 386 U.S. 547, 557 (1967).
verdict for the officers would follow even though the arrest was in fact
unconstitutional." 15
Subsequently, the Court cited efficiency concerns in dispensing with the
subjective "good faith" component of the qualified immunity analysis.
Harlow v. Fitzgerald explained that subjective good faith is a factual matter
best suited for jury resolution and, as such, "frequently has proved
incompatible with our admonition... that insubstantial claims should not
proceed to trial." 16 The standard for qualified immunity, therefore, became
purely objective: "[G]overnment officials performing discretionary functions
generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their
conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights
of which a reasonable person would have known." 7
For several years following Harlow, the Court remained noncommittal
about the structure of the immunity analysis. i8 It first introduced the notion
of the qualified immunity inquiry as bipartite and sequential in Siegert v.
Gilley, in which a clinical psychologist brought a due process claim against
his former supervisor at a federal government hospital for giving him a poor
recommendation that ultimately resulted in a denial of the credential
necessary to work at a military hospital. 19 The D.C. Circuit had assumed,
without deciding, that the plaintiff had made out a constitutional violation,
but had granted qualified immunity to the defendant on the ground that the
law was not clearly established.20  The Court stated that it had "granted
certiorari in order to clarify the analytical structure under which a claim of
qualified immunity should be addressed," holding that "petitioner's claim
failed at an analytically earlier stage of the inquiry into qualified immunity:
His allegations, even if accepted as true, did not state a claim for violation of
any rights secured to him under the United States Constitution."'', The
Court's rationale offered little insight into this holding. Justice Rehnquist's
opinion described the determination of whether the right exists as a
"necessary concomitant" to the question of whether that right is clearly
15. Id.
16. 457 U.S. 800, 815-16 (1982).
17. Id. at 818.
18. See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 528 (1985) (noting that appellate courts addressing
interlocutory appeals of qualified immunity rulings "need not... determine whether the plaintiffs
allegations actually state a claim" but rather need determine only "whether the legal norms allegedly
violated by the defendant were clearly established at the time of the challenged actions"); United
States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 924-25 (1984) (emphasizing that "courts have considerable discretion
in conforming their decisionmaking processes to the exigencies of particular cases"); see also John
M.M. Greabe, Mirabile Dictum!: The Case for "Unnecessary" Constitutional Rulings in Civil
Rights Damages Actions, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 403, 415 n.59 (1999) (collecting cases).
19. 500 U.S. 226, 228-29 (1991).
20. Id.at230-31.
21. Id. at 227, 231 (citation omitted).
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established, and held that "[d]ecision of this purely legal question permits
courts expeditiously to weed out suits which fail the test.without requiring a
defendant who rightly claims qualified immunity to engage in expensive and
time consuming preparation to defend the suit on its merits."' 22 But whether
the law is clearly established is a different question from whether the law
was violated: the latter asks what the law is, while the former merely asks
whether a reasonable officer would have had notice of the state of the law.23
Moreover, an initial determination of whether a violation took place does
nothing to "weed out" suits in which the plaintiff will lose; indeed, given
that the question of whether a violation took place may depend on disputed
factual issues requiring jury resolution, thus delaying, rather than expediting,
a grant of qualified immunity.
Following Siegert, the Court alluded to the notion of sequencing but did
not elucidate the approach described in that case. Writing for the Court,
Justice Souter explained in 1998 in County of Sacramento v. Lewis:
[A]s we have held, the better approach to resolving cases in which
the defense of qualified immunity is raised is to determine first
whether the plaintiff has alleged a deprivation of a constitutional
right at all. Normally, it is only then that a court should ask whether
the right allegedly implicated was clearly established at the time of
the events in question.24
Justice Souter's description of the doctrine is carefully couched in non-
absolute terms: The sequencing approach is the "better approach," and
should be followed "normally," but is not mandatory. And his justification
for sequencing is party-neutral: "[I]f the policy of avoidance were always
followed in favor of ruling on qualified immunity whenever there was no
clearly settled constitutional rule of primary conduct, standards of official
conduct would tend to remain uncertain, to the detriment both of officials
and individuals., 25  In short, Justice Souter reasoned that sequencing is
necessary to benefit defendant government officers and plaintiff citizens
alike.
22. Id. at 232.
23. See, e.g., Pierre N. Leval, Judging Under the Constitution: Dicta about Dicta, 81 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 1249, 1278 n.86 (2006).
24. 523 U.S. 833, 841 n.5 (1998).
25. Id.
Writing for the Court the following term in Wilson v. Layne, Justice
Rehnquist reiterated, without explanation, his claim that deciding the
constitutional question before the question of whether the law was clearly
established facilitates early resolution of the qualified immunity issue.26 But
like Justice Souter, he also emphasized the value of articulating legal
standards: "Deciding the constitutional question before addressing the
qualified immunity question also promotes clarity in the legal standards for
official conduct, to the benefit of both the officers and the general public. 27
One reading of this statement is that, if courts make the law clear,
government officials will better be able to tailor their actions to the
applicable legal standards-thus both protecting themselves from suit and
better serving the public. A logical extension of the statement, however, is
that the law will be sufficiently clear to allow plaintiffs to overcome a
qualified immunity defense if defendant officers fail to alter their conduct.
In the wake of Siegert, Sacramento, and Wilson, a split arose among the
federal courts. Many courts read those three decisions to hold that they
should generally decide the constitutional issue first.28 A few courts even
21read the decisions to require sequencing. Other courts, however,
maintained that the option of bypassing the constitutional question survived
those cases .30 The courts that acknowledged the benefits of sequencing
generally focused on its law-elaboration function. For instance, the Seventh
Circuit justified a decision to address the constitutional issue first "[i]n order
that legal doctrine may continue to evolve in common law fashion."'"
In 2001, however, the legal landscape changed with Saucier v. Katz, in
which the Court made sequencing mandatory.3 2 Justice Kennedy, writing
for the majority, held that initial decision of the constitutional issue is
required:
As we shall explain, the first inquiry must be whether a
constitutional right would have been violated on the facts alleged;
second, assuming the violation is established, the question whether
26. 526 U.S. 603, 609 (1999).
27. Id.
28. See Pearson v. Ramos, 237 F.3d 881, 884 (7th Cir. 2001) (vacating jury verdict on ground
that no constitutional violation occurred without addressing qualified immunity question, while
noting that "[w]hether [the sequencing approach] is absolute may be doubted"); Kalka v. Hawk, 215
F.3d 90, 94-98 (D.C. Cir. 2000); Home v. Coughlin, 191 F.3d 244, 245 (2d Cir. 1999).
29. See Cline v. Binder, No. 98-2433, 1999 WL 507199 (4th Cir. July 19, 1999) (unpublished
table decision); McCall v. Williams, 59 F. Supp. 2d 556 (D.S.C. 1999).
30. See Spivey v. Elliot, 41 F.3d 1497, 1498-99 (11 th Cir. 1995); Acierno v. Cloutier, 40 F.3d
597, 606 n.7 (3d Cir. 1994).
31. Pearson, 237 F.3d at 884.
32. 533 U.S. 194 (2001). Commentators have also read Saucier to make sequencing mandatory.
See, e.g., Healy, supra note 10, at 880-81 (noting that Saucier made sequencing mandatory).
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the right was clearly established must be considered on a more
specific level than recognized by the Court of Appeals.
33
Likewise, "A court required to rule upon the qualified immunity issue
must consider, then, this threshold question: Taken in the light most
favorable to the party asserting the injury, do the facts alleged show the
officer's conduct violated a constitutional right? This must be the initial
inquiry., 3 4 In support of mandatory sequencing, the Court emphasized that
sequencing was "necessary to set forth principles which will become the
basis for a [future] holding that a right is clearly established. 35 In other
words, it was concerned about future plaintiffs being able to recover. The
Court also-still without explanation-reiterated the link between the
sequencing approach and the early resolution of the qualified immunity
issue.36
Between Saucier and Pearson, the Court generally adhered to the
sequencing approach 37 and for justification gestured at the importance of
clarifying the law.38 Yet the Court also once ignored its own sequencing
requirement without acknowledging that it did so. In a per curiam opinion
in Brosseau v. Haugen, the Court reversed the Ninth Circuit's holding that
the defendant was not entitled to summary judgment, thereby granting
qualified immunity while "express[ing] no view as to the correctness of the
Court of Appeals' decision on the constitutional question itself."39 But the
Court also stated: "We have no occasion in this case to reconsider our
instruction in Saucier that lower courts decide the constitutional question
prior to deciding the qualified immunity question., 40 And in Scott v. Harris,
the Court, in an opinion by Justice Scalia joined by seven other Justices,
33. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 200.
34. Id. at 201.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 200-01.
37. See Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2624 (2007); Scott v. Harris, 127 S. Ct. 1769, 1774
(2007); L.A. County v. Rettele, 127 S. Ct. 1989, 1994 (2007); Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 563
(2004); Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 766 (2003); Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 736-39
(2002).
38. For example, in Bunting v. Mellen, Justice Scalia's dissent from the denial of certiorari
reemphasized the law-clarification function of the sequencing approach. He explained that the initial
resolution of the constitutional question "is not mere dictum in the ordinary sense, since the whole
reason we require it to be set forth (despite the availability of qualified immunity) is to clarify the
law and thus make unavailable repeated claims of qualified immunity in future cases." Bunting v.
Mellen, 541 U.S. 1019, 1023-24 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
39. 543 U.S. 194, 198 (2004).
40. Id. at 198 n.3.
hinted at doubts "regarding the wisdom of Saucier's decision to make the
threshold inquiry mandatory, especially in cases where the constitutional
question is relatively difficult and the qualified immunity question relatively
straightforward."'" Again, however, the Court explained that it "need not
address the wisdom of Saucier in this case" because the constitutional
question was easily decided, and thus sequencing was the best approach
regardless whether it was mandatory.42
The Court broadcast its doubts about Saucier when it granted certiorari
in Pearson v. Callahan.43 While the case involved a Fourth Amendment
challenge to a warrantless search on the basis of "consent once removed,"
the Justices also instructed the parties to brief a question that neither side had
raised: "Whether the Court's decision in Saucier v. Katz should be
overruled? 44  The Court ultimately answered that question in the
affirmative.45 Evaluation of its decision requires consideration of thejurisprudential and practical consequences of sequencing, and I will outline
these consequences in the next section.
III. CRITIQUING SEQUENCING
Saucier was a lightning rod for criticism-indeed, Judge Leval of the
Second Circuit has described it as "involv[ing] so many and such serious
problems that I am not sure where to begin., 46 At a jurisprudential level, the
primary criticism is, as Justice Breyer explained in Morse, that sequencing
fails to "adhere to a basic constitutional obligation by avoiding unnecessary
decision of constitutional questions., 47  Simply put, avoidance may be
thought of as a "last resort rule": "[E]ven if all other jurisdictional and
justiciability obstacles are surmounted, federal courts still must avoid a
constitutional issue if there is any other ground upon which to render a final
judgment. 48
The primary justification for avoidance is rooted in the principle of
separation of powers. The concern that one branch will "encroach on the
domain of another" 49 requires that judges abstain from passing upon the
41. Scott, 127 S. Ct. at 1774 n.4.
42. Id.
43. 128 S. Ct. 1702 (2008).
44. Id. at 1702-03 (2008) (citation omitted).
45. Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808 (2009).
46. See, e.g., Leval, supra note 23, at 1277.
47. Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2640 (2007).
48. Lisa A. Kloppenberg, Avoiding Constitutional Questions, 35 B.C. L. REV. 1003, 1025
(1994); see Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring)
("The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question although properly presented by the record,
if there is also present some other ground upon which the case may be disposed of.").
49. Ashwander, 297 U.S. at 355 (quoting Sinking-Fund Cases, 99 U.S. 700, 718 (1878)).
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constitutionality of statutes unless no alternative basis for decision is
available. But such concern is tied closely to the fact that a statute is a
legislative product, and therefore its invalidation by the judiciary risks
undermining majority rule without political accountability.5 0  In the
qualified immunity context, however, the acts in question are those of
individual government officers-members of the executive branch-rather
than of the legislature. Thus, the underlying justification for avoidance is
surely less compelling in the context of adjudicating qualified immunity
disputes."1
Some commentators have also argued that avoidance is desirable
because courts may lack the incentive to give due consideration to an issue
that has no effect on the outcome of the case before it.52 But this assumption
is both lacking in empirical support and questionable as a general
proposition because courts experience considerable scrutiny of each
sentence in their opinions. Such scrutiny likely provides an incentive to
decide constitutional issues properly even when those issues do not
determine the outcome of the case. Relatedly, commentators have
contended that individual litigants may fail to adequately brief and argue
constitutional issues when there is a chance a court may avoid those issues.
5 3
But particularly in the qualified immunity context, the failure to brief the
constitutional issue may be dispositive if the court finds there was no
constitutional violation-it would seem, therefore, that both parties have a
substantial incentive to argue that issue vigorously.
In any event, the principle of avoidance is not ironclad: courts routinely
decide constitutional questions unnecessarily in other contexts. For
instance, harmless error doctrine instructs courts first to decide whether an
error actually occurred, and only then to determine whether such error was
harmless.54 Similarly, under the relevant standard for habeas corpus relief, a
court need only determine whether a state court's decision "was contrary to,
50. One commentator has suggested that the "countermajoritarian difficulty" arising from
avoidance may be overstated, explaining that our system of government is "dialogic," and so a
court's constitutional pronouncement will seldom be the final word. Kloppenberg, supra note 48, at
1037-42.
51. See Greabe, supra note 18, at 418-24.
52. See, e.g., Healy, supra note 10, at 920-21.
53. See id.
54. See, e.g., Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 369 n.2 ("Harmless error analysis is triggered
only after the reviewing court discovers that an error has been committed."). The Court's instruction
with regard to harmless error responded to a practice by lower courts of withholding judgment as to
whether a constitutional error occurred and simply holding that any such error was harmless. See,
e.g., United States v. Pravato, 505 F.2d 703, 704 (2d Cir. 1974).
677
or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law,
as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States., 55 But courts
frequently decide the relevant question of federal law rather than simply
stating that the state decision did not contravene clearly established
principles. 56
In light of the lack of separation of powers concerns present here, as
well as the various exceptions to avoidance doctrine throughout
constitutional law, I view the general rule of avoidance as insufficient to
automatically invalidate the sequencing approach. Nonetheless, the
avoidance norm is so firmly entrenched in American jurisprudence that any
deviation from that norm deserves careful consideration.
The mandatory sequencing approach also potentially undermines the
process of appellate review. 57 If a court holds that a defendant violated the
Constitution but then grants qualified immunity to that defendant,
sequencing may "immunize an incorrect constitutional holding from further
review., 58  As a prevailing party, the defendant cannot appeal the
constitutional ruling, even if it believes the ruling is incorrect and the
consequences of that ruling are unfavorable for both that defendant and
others who are similarly situated. So if the plaintiffs decide not to appeal the
qualified immunity determination, the constitutional decision remains
enshrined in the caselaw.
The Court's denial of certiorari in Bunting v. Mellen provides a prime
example of this difficulty. Indeed, Justice Scalia, dissenting from the denial,
described the situation as a "perceived procedural tangle of the Court's own
making."59 Bunting arose from an Establishment Clause challenge to the
Virginia Military Institute's (VMI) invocation of God during its Supper Roll
Call ceremony, brought by cadets who sought declaratory and injunctive
relief as well as monetary damages. 60 After prevailing in district court, the
cadets graduated from VMI, thereby mooting their claims to declaratory and
injunctive relief.6' The Fourth Circuit held that the invocation was
unconstitutional, but granted qualified immunity to the VMI officials.62 The
55. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2000).
56. See Healy, supra note 10, at 886 (collecting cases).
57. The frequency with which this situation actually occurs is discussed in more detail in the next
section. See infra Part IV.
58. Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2641 (2007) (Breyer, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part); see Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 202 (Breyer, J., concurring)
("[Sequencing] can sometimes lead to a constitutional decision that is effectively insulated from
review." (citing Bunting v. Mellen, 541 U.S. 1019, 1025 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari))).
59. Bunting, 541 U.S. at 1022 (Scalia, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
60. Id. at 1022-23.
61. Id. at 1022.
62. Id.
678
[Vol. 36: 667, 2009] The Saucier Qualified Immunity Experiment
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
Court then denied VMI's petition for certiorari in part because the Court will
not entertain an appeal by a party on an issue on which that party prevailed,
and VMI had technically prevailed on the monetary damages action via the
favorable qualified immunity ruling it received.63  Such a result is
particularly perverse because VMI almost certainly viewed the constitutional
issue-the preservation of its traditional invocation practice-as greater in
importance than the damages immunity of its officials.
This sequencing-created problem could potentially be resolved by an
exception to the rule against appeals initiated by prevailing parties. In
protest of the Bunting certiorari denial, Justice Scalia wrote, "I think it plain
that this general rule should not apply where a favorable judgment on
qualified-immunity grounds would deprive a party of an opportunity to
appeal the unfavorable (and often more significant) constitutional
determination." 64 But neither the Supreme Court nor the lower federal
courts have acknowledged such an exception.65 So under the current
sequencing framework, any defendant that loses on the merits but prevails
on qualified immunity grounds has the potential to find itself in the position
of VMI: saddled with an adverse constitutional ruling it has no power to
appeal because it is, technically, a prevailing party.
Mandatory sequencing also engenders a host of undesirable practical
consequences, not least the requirement that courts grapple unnecessarily
with complex constitutional issues. Several Justices have voiced concern
that the Saucier rule "rigidly requires courts unnecessarily to decide difficult
constitutional questions when there is available an easier basis for the
decision (e.g., qualified immunity) that will satisfactorily resolve the case
before the court.",66 The Court's reluctance to endorse unnecessary decision
of "difficult" questions embodies two concerns.
63. Id. at 1023.
64. Id.
65. See, e.g., Kalka v. Hawk, 215 F.3d 90, 96 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (postulating that "government
defendants [as the prevailing parties] will ... have no opportunity to appeal for review of the newly
declared constitutional right in the higher courts").
66. Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 201 (2004) (Breyer, J., concurring). Justices Breyer,
Ginsberg, and Scalia have consistently raised the unnecessary decision of difficult constitutional
questions as an argument against mandatory sequencing. See Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618,
2640 (2007) (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("In order to avoid resolving the
fractious underlying constitutional question, we need only decide a different question that this case
presents, the question of 'qualified immunity."'); Scott v. Harris, 127 S. Ct. 1769, 1774 n.4 (2007)
(Scalia, J.) (expressing doubt about sequencing "especially in cases where the constitutional question
is relatively difficult and the qualified immunity question relatively straightforward"); id. at 1780
(Breyer, J., concurring); L.A. County v. Rettele, 127 S. Ct. 1989, 1994 (2007) (Stevens, J.,
concurring, joined by Ginsburg, J.) ("Consequently, regardless of the proper answer to the
The first concern is that inefficiency will ensue from courts expending
the time and resources to puzzle through difficult constitutional questions.
Justice Breyer has argued that "when courts' dockets are crowded, a rigid
'order of battle' makes little administrative sense, 67 adding that sequencing
sometimes "will require lower courts unnecessarily to answer difficult
constitutional questions, thereby wasting judicial resources., 68  Such
inefficiency is compounded by the fact that courts often confront the
qualified immunity question early in the course of litigation, spurred on by
the Court's insistence that qualified immunity should be resolved as
expeditiously as possible "so that the costs and expenses of trial are avoided
where the defense is dispositive. '69  In a significant number of cases,
therefore, courts decide these difficult constitutional questions on a motion
to dismiss-indeed, my research reveals that, in 2006 and 2007, 24.6% of
cases in which a court addressed a qualified immunity issue took place on a
motion to dismiss. 70  At these early stages of the proceedings the
constitutional issues are more likely to be insufficiently briefed by parties
struggling to meet ambitious filing deadlines, so courts will therefore have to
invest even more judicial resources in compensating for these shortcomings
with their own research.7'
The efficiency problem, while serious in its own right, also segues into a
broader worry: that in their effort to decide difficult constitutional questions
with the limited time and resources available to them, courts will make bad
constitutional question, the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity. I would reverse on thatground and disavow the unwise practice of deciding constitutional questions in advance of the
necessity for doing so.").
67. Brosseau, 543 U.S. at 201-02 (Breyer, J., concurring, joined by Scalia & Ginsburg, JJ.)(citing Bunting, 541 U.S. at 1025 (Scalia, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari)).
68. Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2641 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
69. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200 (2001); see, e.g., Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227(1991) (per curiam) ("[W]e repeatedly have stressed the importance of resolving immunity questions
at the earliest possible stage in litigation.").
70. Of these cases, in 21.5% the qualified immunity issue was raised on a motion to dismiss, andin 3.1% that issue was raised on a motion styled in the alternative as a motion to dismiss or a motion
for summary judgment. In addition, 73.8% of cases involved qualified immunity raised on a motionfor summary judgment, bringing the total of cases in which a court addressed the qualified immunity
issue on either a motion to dismiss or a motion for summary judgment to approximately 98%. For adescription of my research methodology, see infra Part IV.A. See Leval, supra note 23, at 1275("We dismiss a large number of [qualified immunity] cases, probably the great majority, at the outset
because it is immediately apparent that there are no rulings establishing the unconstitutionality of the
officer's conduct.").
71. Indeed, as Professor Ravenell has observed, plaintiffs may not have pled a violation of
clearly established law, given that qualified immunity is an affirmative defense for which the burden
falls on the defendant to raise. Teressa E. Ravenell, Hammering in Screws: Why the Court Should
Look Beyond Summary Judgment When Resolving §1983 Qualified Immunity Disputes, 52 VILL. L.
REV. 135, 164-65 (2007). Judgment on a motion to dismiss is particularly premature under such
circumstances.
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law. 72 Justice Breyer expressed this concern in County of Sacramento v.
Lewis, when he wrote in concurrence that "[Siegert] should not be read to
deny lower courts the flexibility, in appropriate cases, to decide [§1983]
claims on the basis of qualified immunity, and thereby avoid wrestling with
constitutional issues that are either difficult or poorly presented. 7 3 Justice
Stevens, concurring in the judgment, likewise registered an objection to the
Court's statement that sequencing is "normally" the "better approach." He
argued: "That is sound advice when the answer to the constitutional question
is clear. When, however, the question is both difficult and unresolved, I
believe it wiser to adhere to the policy of avoiding the unnecessary
adjudication of constitutional questions. 74  Thus, without denying the
concern for articulating legal principles that underlies the sequencing
approach, Justices Breyer and Stevens express concern for the quality of the
law articulated. No law, they suggest, is better than bad law.75 And their
concern that courts will do a poor job of articulating constitutional principles
seems intuitively reasonable if courts are forced to make law under
conditions of constrained resources and insufficient briefing.
But the Justices' reasoning also exposes a quandary. Although the
objection to deciding constitutional questions unnecessarily is that doing so
will require courts to resolve difficult constitutional questions, the entire
reason for courts to address these questions is to clarify difficult areas of the
law for the benefit of government officials and public citizens. Deciding the
constitutional question only when the answer is already "clear," as Justice
Stevens recommends, would do little to clarify the constitutional standards
72. At first blush, this discussion may seem to contradict the previous discussion of
constitutional avoidance. See supra text accompanying notes 52-53. My point with respect to
avoidance, however, is simply that one cannot generalize about the behavior of judges and parties:
we cannot assume that judges will decide a constitutional issue in a cursory fashion simply because
it is unnecessary to the result, nor can we assume that parties will brief a constitutional issue
inadequately simply because the court may not reach that issue. Therefore, a universal principle of
avoidance predicated on these assumptions is unwarranted. Here, by contrast, I wish to raise the
possibility that the difficulty of the constitutional question and the thoroughness of the briefing may
at times make decision of the constitutional issue difficult and time-consuming for judges.
73. 523 U.S. 833, 858-59 (Breyer, J., concurring); see Scott v. Harris, 127 S. Ct. 1769, 1780
(2007) (Breyer, J., concurring) ("Sometimes ... the order-of-battle rule will spawn constitutional
rulings in areas of law so fact dependent that the result will be confusion rather than clarity.");
Wilkie v. Robbins, 127 S. Ct. 2588, 2617 n.10 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part, joined by Stevens, J.) ("As I have elsewhere indicated, in appropriate cases, I
would allow courts to move directly to the second inquiry.").
74. Lewis, 523 U.S. at 859 (Stevens, J., concurring).
75. Judge Leval also raises the possibility that the defendant may not be sufficiently invested in
the constitutional issue to brief the issue in a manner helpful to the court. Leval, supra note 23, at
1278.
applicable to government officials' conduct. Nor would such a decision
increase the number of injured plaintiffs who could recover, because if a
particular constitutional principle is already "clear," then any government
official who acted in contravention of that principle would already be unable
to raise the defense of qualified immunity.
The confluence of jurisprudential and practical problems outlined here
has led four Justices-Breyer, Ginsburg, Stevens, and Scalia-to state
explicitly that sequencing should not be mandatory.7 6  And, responding to
these Justices' cues, lower courts have not uniformly adhered to the
sequencing approach. The First, Second, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits have,
in some instances, deviated from sequencing, although they have not
articulated clear standards for when such deviation is appropriate.77 And
several other courts have chosen to disregard the sequencing requirement in
select unpublished opinions. 78
Sequencing proponents, however, claim that all these objections are
outweighed by the law-elaboration function of sequencing. And certainly
compelling considerations favor resolving a constitutional issue even when
doing so is unnecessary because the court would ultimately grant qualified
immunity. Rather obviously, if a court skips over the constitutional question
and simply grants qualified immunity, then a constitutional question
controversial enough to engender litigation remains unanswered. 79 Negative
consequences ensue for both governments and individuals. Governments
lack guidance in training their employees and crafting policies to conform to
constitutional standards. And for citizens, a potential category of wrong
76. Indeed, a fifth Justice presently seated on the Court-Justice Kennedy-concurred in the
judgment in Siegert to state:
I do not, however, agree that the Court of Appeals [should not have avoided the
constitutional issue]. The Court of Appeals adopted the altogether normal procedure of
deciding the case before it on the ground that appeared to offer the most direct and
appropriate resolution, and one argued by the parties. If it is plain that a plaintiff's
required malice allegations are insufficient but there is some doubt as to the constitutional
right asserted, it seems to reverse the usual ordering of issues to tell the trial and appellate
courts that they should resolve the constitutional question first.
Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 235 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring). Given that Justice Kennedy
authored Saucier, however, we may reasonably infer that he has now renounced his previously-
stated attachment to "the usual ordering of issues."
77. See, e.g., Hatfield-Bermudez v. Aldanondo-Rivera, 496 F.3d 51, 59 (1st Cir. 2007); Roberts
v. Ward, 468 F.3d 963 (6th Cir. 2006); Koch v. Brattleboro, 287 F.3d 162 (2d Cir. 2002); Pearson v.
Ramos, 237 F.3d 881, 884 (7th Cir. 2001).
78. See, e.g., Corbett v. Garland, 228 F. App'x 525 (6th Cir. 2007); Lathan v. Thompson, 251 F.App'x. 665 (11 th Cir. 2007); Olagues v. Kousharian, 177 F. App'x 537 (9th Cir. 2006); Bruton v.
Paesani, 162 F. App'x 151 (3d Cir. 2006); Hill v. Fleming, 173 F. App'x 664 (10th Cir. 2006);
Rolen v. City of Brownfield, 182 F. App'x 362 (5th Cir. 2006).
79. Bunting v. Mellen, 541 U.S. 1019, 1023-24 (Scalia, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari)("That constitutional determination is not mere dictum in the ordinary sense, since the whole reason
we require it to be set forth (despite the availability of qualified immunity) is to clarify the law and
thus make unavailable repeated claims of qualified immunity in future cases.").
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remains, troublingly, irremediable for the indefinite future. Without
clarification of the law, no future plaintiff, even one who has suffered an
identical injury, can overcome a government official's defense that the
relevant law was not clearly established. 0 This concern is not theoretical.
Writing before the Court's decision in Saucier, John Greabe has argued
compellingly in favor of resolving constitutional issues, collecting numerous
cases where courts' failure to clarify novel constitutional questions left
officials uncertain about the standards that should govern their conduct and
potentially wronged citizens without recourse to money damages.
81
Sequencing dissidents have struggled to marshal arguments to counter
the claim that, if courts repeatedly avoid difficult constitutional questions,
the law will remain unclear and many plaintiffs will remain unable to
recover. Justice Stevens has attempted to allay this concern by asserting that
such contentions may be addressed in other contexts such as "adversarial
suits against municipalities, which have a substantial stake in the outcome
and a risk of exposure to damages liability even when individual officers are
plainly protected by qualified immunity."82  While suits against
municipalities undoubtedly also can clarify the law, Justice Stevens's
response is incomplete because a suit against a municipality requires the
additional showing of a policy or custom that engendered the alleged
violation.83 This requirement may be prohibitive in many instances.
Moreover, while some constitutional claims are likely to be raised by
defendants in criminal proceedings-where the incentive for raising the
claim is high and an attorney is provided free of charge to the indigent-
other claims are not susceptible to such resolution.
84 In the Fourth
Amendment context, for example, victims of excessive use of force by
police officers are far less likely to litigate their claims due to the time and
80. As Greabe explains:
When a court bypasses the merits of the pleaded constitutional claim in the circumstances
just described, it not only effectively awards the defendant officers one 'liability-free'
violation of the Constitution (as it must under the doctrine of qualified immunity), but it
also, by declining to 'clearly establish' the undermined right, paves the way for 'multiple
bites of a constitutionally forbidden fruit.'
Greabe, supra note 18, at 430 (quoting Garcia by Garcia v. Miera, 817 F.2d 650, 656-57 n.8 (10th
Cir. 1987) (criticizing avoidance of constitutional questions in qualified immunity context)).
81. Id.at429n.139.
82. County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 859 (1998); see Rosenthal, supra note 1, at
859 n.241 (questioning whether qualified immunity doctrine "has stunted the development of
constitutional law," given that new constitutional law also grows from suits for injunctive relief,
suits against municipal policies, and criminal litigation).
83. Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978).
84. Karlan, supra note 8, at 1915-16.
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expense associated with finding an attorney and filing suit. 85 The notion that
the law may be clarified via mechanisms other than § 1983 suits against
individual government defendants, therefore, is an incomplete response to
sequencing proponents' emphasis on the need for law elaboration.
The key to settling the sequencing debate, therefore, lies in closer
examination-at an empirical rather than theoretical level-of the law-
clarification function of sequencing. Following Saucier's sequencing
requirement, How did courts resolve the constitutional questions that they
previously would have avoided? To that end, I collected data regarding the
effect of the Court's imposition of the sequencing rationale over time, and in
the next section, I present a quantitative analysis that supplies insight into
this previously unanswered question and another framework for evaluating
the Supreme Court's recent decision to overrule Saucier.
IV. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
My research attempted to measure the effect of Siegert and Saucier on
federal courts' decisions in qualified immunity cases. Caselaw prior to
Siegert reveals that, left to their own devices, courts would practice
constitutional avoidance and decide many cases on qualified immunity
grounds alone. Saucier, however, required decision of the constitutional
question the case presents. I strove, therefore, to determine how courts
decided those constitutional questions that they previously would have
avoided.
My empirical examination proceeded from the assumption that the cases
where courts previously chose to avoid the constitutional question generally
presented more difficult constitutional issues. In those cases, the
constitutional question was close enough that the court opted to resolve the
case on immunity grounds instead. Indeed, one might reasonably predict
that these difficult decisions, balanced on a knife edge, would come out in
favor of the plaintiff and the defendant with similar frequency. My research
sought to determine whether empirical reality bore out this tentative
hypothesis.
A. Methodology
I used the cases available on Westlaw as my data set. Within the
database containing all federal district court cases (DCT), I generated a
numbered list of every case containing the term "qualified immunity" for
each of three time periods: (1) two years before Siegert; (2) two years before
85. Id. at 1916.
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Saucier; and (3) two recent calendar years, 2006 and 2007. I did the same
within the database containing all federal appellate court cases (CTA).
It was not feasible to read every case decided during each of these time
periods,8 6 so I instead examined a random sample of cases from each time
period. To ensure that cases I read were a random sample, I used a random
sequence generator to create a numerical sequence containing the number of
cases in each of the three lists. 87 I then read the cases in the order dictated
by the sequence. For example, for the two years leading up to Siegert,
Westlaw contains 746 district court cases that contain the words "qualified
immunity." I therefore used the random sequence generator to create a
sequence including the integers 1 to 746. The sequence began with 305, so
the 305th case on my Westlaw-generated list became the first case that I
read.88
Not every case that I read became part of my sample. Rather, a case
became part of the sample only if it met the following criteria: (1) a plaintiff
brought at least one constitutional or federal statutory claim seeking money
damages against an individual government-official defendant; (2) the
defendant raised a qualified immunity defense against that claim; and (3) the
court decided the merits of either the constitutional or statutory claim, the
86. The district court database on Westlaw contained 746 cases containing the words "qualified
immunity" for the two years before Siegert, 1,720 cases for the two years before Saucier, and 6,680
cases for the years 2006 and 2007. The appellate court database contained 646 cases containing the
words "qualified immunity" for the two years before Siegert, 1,146 cases for the two years before
Saucier, and 1,195 cases for the years 2006 and 2007. There are considerably more cases in later
years-particularly district court cases for 2006 and 2007-because, over time, Westlaw has
included a greater number of unpublished cases from many jurisdictions. See infra notes 122-125
and accompanying text.
87. The random sequence generator I used is available at Random.org, http://www.random.org/
sequences/ (last visited March 24, 2009).
88. I acknowledge some imperfections in my data set. Westlaw itself is biased in a number of
ways. It contains all published cases, but only some unpublished cases. The percentage of
unpublished cases it contains varies from one jurisdiction to the next. This percentage also has
changed over time. Relatedly, different jurisdictions vary dramatically in the percentage of
decisions they publish. In short, discrepancies between published and unpublished cases might, in
many instances, taint Westlaw-based empirical work. I found, however, that for my purposes, no
material difference existed in the results for published and unpublished cases. See infra text
accompanying notes 119-125. As an alternative to Westlaw, I considered looking at all cases-both
published and unpublished-from selected jurisdictions, but concluded that this tactic would risk
introducing idiosyncrasies associated with certain jurisdictions. Despite Westlaw's imperfections,
therefore, I concluded that it was best suited to my purposes. Finally, other empirical research
indicates that Westlaw and Lexis contain a very similar set of cases, so my decision to use Westlaw
rather than Lexis was unlikely to influence the result. See Brian N. Lizotte, Publish or Perish: The
Electronic Availability of Summary Judgments by Eight District Courts, 2007 Wis. L. REv. 107, 134
(2007) (reporting that only 6% of cases in relevant data set appeared in one database but not the
other).
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qualified immunity claim, or both. A case on the Westlaw-generated list
might fail to meet these criteria for any number of reasons. The case might
have been resolved on other grounds-for example, the court might have
held that the case was brought outside the statute of limitations, the case was
moot, or the plaintiff lacked standing. Or the case might mention qualified
immunity (in a parenthetical describing another case, for example) even if it
did not actually involve the assertion of a qualified immunity defense. For
each of the six Westlaw-generated lists, between a quarter and a third of the
cases on the list did not meet the three criteria set forth above. If a case did
not meet my criteria, I did not include it in my data set. I continued reading
cases until I had a set of 100 district court and 100 appellate cases that met
my criteria from each of the three time periods.
Unsurprisingly, some of the 100 cases involved more than one claimed
constitutional or statutory 89 violation against which qualified immunity was
raised. 90 For each time period, therefore, I created a spreadsheet in which I
listed separately each claim adjudicated in each of the 100 cases. 9'
Some cases also involved the same claim brought against multiple
defendants. I listed the claims against multiple defendants separately only
where the court reached different results for different defendants. For
example, if a prisoner brought a § 1983 suit against twelve prison officials,
claiming that they were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs,
and the court held that none of the twelve had committed a constitutional
violation, the suit counted once. If, however, the court held that one of the
twelve officers had violated the Constitution and was not entitled to
qualified immunity, I would list that claim twice on my spreadsheet. In
other words, a different result led to a separate listing. 92
89. As it turned out, most of the claims against which defendants asserted qualified immunity
were constitutional claims. Throughout the paper, I will refer to the elements of the sequencinginquiry as "the constitutional issue" and "the qualified immunity issue." The former, however,
should always be understood to refer to "the constitutional or statutory issue."
90. If a defendant raised qualified immunity against some claims but not others within a single
case, I did not include the claims against which the qualified immunity defense was not raised in my
data set.
91. These spreadsheets are available at Nancy Leong, http://nancyleong.com/the-saucier-qual
ified-immunity-experiment-an-empirical-analysis-36-pepperdine-law-review-667-24/ (last visited
Apr. 13, 2009).
92. This method of counting separate defendants only when they generated different results is
admittedly imperfect. However, I chose it because it is better than any alternative. Counting each
claim against each defendant separately would give undue weight to cases in which the plaintiff(perhaps gratuitously) sued many defendants. The only other alternative-fractional division-
would, I believe, undervalue the significance of the courts allowing a claim to proceed against even
one defendant out of many, because even that holding generates new plaintiff-friendly case law. At
a minimum, my method allows a comparison among results from different time periods because the
methodology is consistent throughout.
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Ultimately, each set of 100 cases generated between 142 and 195
separate claims. 93  I then placed each resulting claim in one of six
categories: 94
(1) The court recognized a constitutional violation but granted qualified
immunity.
(2) The court recognized a violation, then denied immunity. This
included cases decided on a motion to dismiss, a motion for judgment on the
pleadings, or a motion for summary judgment where the court took the facts
in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Thus, to fall in this category, the
court did not need to enter judgment in the plaintiff's favor. Rather, the
court merely needed to hold that the plaintiff could make out a case that her
rights had been violated and that the defendant was not entitled to qualified
immunity, given whatever view of the facts was appropriate at that particular
stage of the proceedings.
(3) The court held that no violation had occurred and did not address
the immunity question.
(4) The court held that no violation had occurred and went on to hold
that, in any event, the defendant was entitled to immunity.
(5) The court granted immunity without addressing whether a
constitutional violation had occurred-in other words, it avoided the
constitutional question.
(6) The court did none of the above. Usually this meant that the court
deviated substantially from prevailing Supreme Court guidelines regarding
the resolution of qualified immunity cases. For example, this residual
category includes cases where the court found (at least for purposes of a
motion to dismiss or a motion for summary judgment) that a constitutional
violation had occurred, yet failed to address whether the defendant was
entitled to qualified immunity (despite the defendant having raised the
defense). 95 It also includes cases where the court (oddly) held that the
defendant was not entitled to qualified immunity-because the relevant law
93. The district court cases yielded 163 claims in the pre-Siegert time period, 165 claims in the
pre-Saucier time period, and 195 claims in the 2006-2007 time period. The appellate court cases
yielded 142 claims in the pre-Siegert time period, 144 claims in the pre-Saucier time period, and 155
claims in the 2006-2007 time period.
94. The six categories enumerated here correspond to the number under the "Type" column on
my spreadsheets. See Nancy Leong, http://nancyleong.com/the-saucier-qualified-immunity-
experiment-an-empirical-analysis-36-pepperdine-law-review- 6 6 7 - 2 4 / (last visited Apr. 13, 2009).
95. See, e.g., Ernst v. Borough of Fort Lee, 739 F. Supp. 220 (D.N.J. 1990) (holding strip search
violated Constitution but failing to address officers' asserted immunity defense).
was clearly established-but that, in fact, no constitutional violation had
occurred.96
Although this categorization was my primary focus, I also collected a
variety of additional information to allow for the possibility of identifying
other trends, including the constitutional or statutory basis for the claim
asserted by the plaintiff, the procedural posture of the case, any subsequent
procedural history, which judge decided the case, and the party of the
president who appointed that judge. 97
Finally, to test the reliability of my own categorization decisions, I
recoded my results by having an independent auditor read and categorize
twenty-five cases from each of my six samples. The rate of agreement was
92%, leading to a conclusion that my results were highly reliable.
B. Summary of Findings
Unsurprisingly, as the Supreme Court moved toward mandatory
sequencing, the percentage of cases in which courts avoided the
constitutional question decreased significantly. 98 Figure 1 summarizes the
results for the district court cases for each of the three time periods for the
claims in which the court found for the defendant. 99 The percentage of
claims where the court avoided the constitutional question decreased from
28.6% [21.2, 36.0] pre-Siegert to 6.4% [2.5, 10.3] in 2006-2007.
Intriguingly, that decrease corresponded to an increase only in the
percentage of claims in which courts found no violation. Thus, the
percentage of claims where the court found a violation but then granted
96. See, e.g., DiLegge v. Gleason, 131 F. Supp. 2d 520 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (holding that qualified
immunity was unavailable because the law was clearly established, yet concluding that no
constitutional or statutory violation had taken place).
97. In addition, for the district court cases I also noted whether the plaintiff was pro se and
whether a magistrate judge was involved. For the appellate court cases I also noted how the district
court had decided the case and whether the appellate court affirmed or reversed that decision. I did
not, however, end up incorporating that data into this paper.
98. Throughout this section, I employ the notation X% [Y, Z] to denote the actual percentage my
sample yielded, followed by the upper and lower boundaries of the 95% confidence interval
associated with the result. Thus, when I say that district courts in the pre-Siegert time period
avoided the constitutional question in 28.6% [21.2, 36.0] of cases, I mean to convey that my best
estimate is 28.6%, but that the actual number could be as low as 21.2% or as high as 36.0%. I expect
that the percentages I found and the uncertainty relating to those percentages will provide sufficient
information for the vast majority of readers. For the statistically inclined, I have also posted a
document on my website detailing the statistical analysis I performed using the data I gathered. See
Nancy Leong, http://nancyleong.com/the-saucier-qualified-immunity-experiment-an-empirical-
analysis-36-pepperdine-law-review-667_24/ (last visited Apr. 13, 2009). Throughout this section, I
have attempted to conform the presentation of my data to the helpful standards elucidated by Lee
Epstein, Andrew D. Martin, & Matthew M. Schneider, On the Effective Communication of the
Results of Empirical Studies, 59 VAND. L. REv. 1811 (2006).
99. 1 have included the precise numerical data from which I created Figures 1 through 6 in the
Appendix.
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immunity actually decreased slightly, from 5.7% [1.8, 9.6] pre-Siegert to
4.5% [2.5, 10.3] in 2006-2007. But the percentage of claims for which the
court found no constitutional right existed increased dramatically, from
65.7% [58.1, 73.3] pre-Siegert to 89.1% in 2006-2007 [84.2, 94.0].'0o
Figure 1: District court claims where the defendant(s) prevailed
107
Avoided constitutional
question; granted immunity
---- Held constitutional violation;
granted immunity
-Held no constitutional
violation
0%
1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008
As depicted in Figure 2, the trend was similar among appellate courts.
The percentage of claims where the court avoided the constitutional question
decreased substantially, from 48.1% [40.1, 56.1] pre-Siegert to only 6.2%
[2.1, 10.3] in 2006-2007. The percentage of claims in which courts found a
constitutional violation but then granted qualified immunity was 5.7% [2.0,
9.4] pre-Siegert and 8.8% [3.9, 13.7] in 2006-2007-thus, the difference
100. These percentages aggregate the percentage of cases where the court simply found no
violation and those in which the court found no violation and went on to grant immunity (perhaps as
a means of protecting the ultimate outcome against appellate reversal). This aggregate percentage is
most useful in considering the overall trends because it reflects the total percentage of cases in which
courts did not recognize a violation. For the sake of revealing the trends within the subcategories,
however, I will include the subcategory breakdown in parentheses following the overall percentage
in the charts contained in the Appendix. The first number represents the percentage of claims where
the court simply found no constitutional violation had occurred. The second number represents the
percentage where the court went on to state that in any event the defendant was entitled to qualified
immunity.
A--
10%/.
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was not statistically significant. But the percentage of claims where the
court found no constitutional right existed increased dramatically, from
46.2% [39.3, 53.1] pre-Siegertto 84.9% [78.8, 91.0] in 2006-2007.
Figure 2: Appellate court claims where the defendant(s) prevailed
-4 Avoided constitutional
question; granted immunity
- Held constitutional
violation; granted immunity
I AHeld no constitutional
violation
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The data for both district and appellate court cases show, therefore, that
the expected significant decrease in the percentage of cases where courts
avoided the constitutional question was accompanied by virtually no change
in the percentage of cases where courts held that a constitutional violation
had taken place and a striking increase in the percentage of cases where
courts held that no constitutional violation had taken place.
The trend remains consistent when claims where the court ultimately
ruled in favor of the plaintiff are included in the calculations.l1l Figure 3
summarizes that data at the district court level: the decline in avoidance
(from 18.6% [13.3, 23.9] pre-Siegert to 5.1% [2.0, 8.2] in 2006-2007) is
accompanied by no change in the likelihood of a court finding a
constitutional violation but granting qualified immunity (level at about 4%)
and a marked increase in the likelihood of the court finding no constitutional
violation (from 42.2% [35.7, 48.7] pre-Siegert to 61.4% [54.7, 68.1] in
101. We would not automatically expect the trend to persist when cases where the court denied
qualified immunity are included. For example, Saucier might have induced courts that would
previously have avoided the constitutional issue to consider the constitutional issue first, reach the
conclusion that a violation occurred, and thus be disinclined to grant qualified immunity to the
defendant officer. Such a trend would result in expansion of constitutional rights, thereby
contradicting the trend seen in Figures I and 2.
0%
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2006-2007). Similarly, Figure 4 summarizes the data at the appellate level:
the decline in avoidance (from 35.4% [28.7, 42.1] pre-Siegert to 4.5% [1.4,
7.6] in 2006-2007) is accompanied by a statistically insignificant change in
the likelihood of a court finding a constitutional violation but granting
qualified immunity (from 4.2% [1.5, 6.9] pre-Siegert to 6.5% [3.0, 10.0] in
2006-2007) and a marked increase in the likelihood of the court finding no
constitutional violation (from 34.0% [27.5, 40.5] pre-Siegert to 61.9% [54.8,
69.0] in 2006-2007).
I note that among district court cases, the percentage of claims where the
court found a constitutional violation and denied qualified immunity
decreased significantly, from 32.3% [26.0, 38.6] prior to Siegert to 14.4%
[9.5, 19.3] in 2006-2007. A decrease in the same category, however, was
not present at the appellate level, where virtually no change occurred.'0 2
Perhaps the decline at the district court level is explicable by a trend among
plaintiffs to bring more claims per lawsuit. 103 But in any event, the decline
in rulings for plaintiffs at the district court level does not explain the overall
increase in the articulation of law favoring defendants.
102. In the pre-Siegert time frame, the court found a violation in 25.0% [19.1, 30.9] of cases, and
in 2006-2007, the court found a constitutional violation in 26.5% [20.2, 32.8] of cases.
103. Within the district court sample, plaintiffs brought a greater average number of claims per
case in 2006-2007 than in the pre-Siegert time period: the 100-case sample for the 2006-2007 time
period yielded 195 claims, while the pre-Siegert sample yielded only 161 claims.
Figure 3: All district court claims
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In the aggregate, these data indicate that the Supreme Court's move
toward mandatory sequencing has had a lopsided influence on the
articulation of new constitutional law. Courts now avoid fewer
constitutional questions, and as a result, generate more constitutional law.
SUU/b I
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But the new constitutional law-law that would not have been made before
Siegert and Saucier-uniformly denies the existence of plaintiffs'
constitutional rights.
I express no opinion on whether sequencing actually creates an incentive
for judges to find against plaintiffs. The data I have collected neither
support nor contradict that conclusion because they offer no insight into how
the courts would have decided the cases they avoided pre-Saucier. Rather,
my research simply reveals an unexpected phenomenon: that the
constitutional questions avoided pre-Saucier are now almost uniformly
decided in defendants' favor. The possibility that sequencing not only
causes the articulation of, but actually incentivizes, denial of constitutional
violations is an intriguing one that perhaps future scholarship will explore.
Finally, I wish to address the other empirical work in this area.
Professor Healy's work examining courts' willingness to expand
constitutional rights in the two years following Saucier is-as far as it
goes--consistent with my results.1°4  Although Healy's methodology
differed from mine in several respects,'0 5 making direct comparison
impossible, he found that courts were far more likely to deny than to
acknowledge new constitutional rights: In 76% of the cases where an
appellate court ultimately granted qualified immunity for the defendants, the
court also held that the asserted constitutional right did not exist, while in
only 17% of cases did the court acknowledge the existence of the right. 106
At a basic level, therefore, our results similarly demonstrate that courts are
more likely to deny than to acknowledge constitutional rights.
104. See Healy, supra note 10, at 930-31, app.
105. I do not wish to criticize Professor Healy's research, which suffices for the purposes of his
eloquent and persuasive article; I merely wish to explain why his results are not suitable for direct
comparison to my own. The differences in methodology are substantial. Healy generated his initial
list from a Westlaw headnote stating Saucier's sequencing requirement. Because many cases might
have cited other precedent for the sequencing requirement (such as the leading case within the
circuit), his list is almost certainly underinclusive. Healy acknowledges this possibility but declares
his methodology sufficient to capture, broadly, the fact that courts are more likely to deny than to
acknowledge constitutional rights when they plan to grant qualified immunity. Id. at 937 n.43 1.
Healy's failure to compare the post-Saucier time frame with a pre-Saucier reference point also limits
the probative value of his data: he cannot claim that sequencing led to increased denial of
constitutional rights when he lacks data regarding the rate of such denials pre-Saucier. Healy also
does not examine cases in which courts found a constitutional right and denied qualified immunity,
which overlooks the possibility that Saucier affected such cases as well. For a discussion of this
possibility, see supra note 100. Finally, Healy makes no attempt to account for situations in which
courts reached different results for different defendants.
106. In the other 7% of cases, Healy found that courts departed from Saucier's sequencing
requirement. Healy, supra note 10, at 930 n.423
Paul Hughes has also published empirical research categorizing all
circuit court cases involving a qualified immunity defense decided in 1988,
1995, and 2005.107 His careful and thorough research reveals-
unsurprisingly in light of Siegert and Saucier-that the appellate courts
followed the Supreme Court's directive with respect to the resolution of the
constitutional issue before the qualified immunity issue: constitutional law
articulation rose from 65% to 74% to 99%, respectively, during the three
time periods examined.10 8 Hughes does not, however, attempt to examine
the nature or quality of the newly articulated law. His paper, therefore,
chiefly demonstrates that the appellate courts largely tend to follow the
procedural framework laid out by the Supreme Court. As such, his work is
fully consistent with both Professor Healy's and my own.
C. Eliminating Other Explanations
Before further exploring the trends in my data, I wish to rule out several
alternate explanations for the results obtained. I considered possible
extrajudicial explanations for the data, as well as some problems with the
data set itself.
Overall composition of courts' dockets. One factor that could call my
results into question is variation in the overall number and composition of
civil rights cases filed. Figure 5 presents data on this issue compiled by the
federal government. 09 Broadly speaking, the total number of non-prisoner-
107. Paul Hughes, Not a Failed Experiment: Wilson-Saucier Sequencing and the Articulation of
Constitutional Rights, 80 COLO. L. REV. 401 (2009).
108. Id.
109. I used data compiled by the U.S. Department of Justice Bureau of Statistics and the
Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts to complete this Figure. I drew the number of civil rights
cases from 1990 to 2000 for cases not involving prisoners from BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,
CIVIL JUSTICE DATA BRIEF: CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINTS IN U.S. DISTRICT COURTS, 2000 (2002),
available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/crcus00.pdf. For 2001 through 2005, I drew the
numbers from ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 2005 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR:
JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 161 tbl. C-2A (2006), available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2005/appendices/c2a.pdf [hereinafter 2005 ANNUAL REPORT]. And
for 2006 and 2007, I drew the numbers from ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 2007 ANNUAL
REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR: JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 145 tbl. C-2
(2008), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2007/appendices/C02Sep07.pdf [hereinafter
2007 ANNUAL REPORT]. For 2001 and later, therefore, the data actually include the twelve months
preceding September 30 of that year-i.e., the data reported for 2001 include cases between October
1, 2000, and September 30, 2001; the data reported for 2002 included cases between October 1,
2001, and September 30, 2002; and so forth. I obtained data regarding prisoner-filed civil rights
cases from 1990 to 2000 by aggregating the claims filed by federal and state inmates reported in
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SPECIAL REPORT: PRISONER PETITIONS FILED IN U.S. DISTRICT
COURTS, 2000, WITH TRENDS 1980-2000, at 2 tbl. 1 (2002), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/
bjs/pub/pdf/ppfusd00.pdf. For 2001 through 2007, 1 drew data from 2005 ANNUAL REPORT, supra,
and 2007 ANNUAL REPORT, supra. To obtain the total number of cases for these years, I added
prisoner civil rights and prison conditions suits together because the civil rights category from the
694
[Vol. 36: 667, 2009] The Saucier Qualified Immunity Experiment
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
initiated civil rights cases increased steadily until 1997, then declined until
the present. Meanwhile, the number of prisoner-initiated suits increased
significantly until 1996, when it declined dramatically-probably due to the
enactment of the Prison Litigation Reform Act, with its requirement of
administrative exhaustion '°-and has remained fairly stable since 2001. In
the aggregate, therefore, the number of civil rights cases commenced in the
federal district courts peaked in 1996 at 83,222, well before Saucier was
decided in 2001, and subsequently declined, steadily, to only 55,781 such
cases in 2007.
These trends in the number of cases filed do not have any inherent
implication for my data. Even if the raw number of cases changed, the
percent of such cases that were decided in a particular way would not
necessarily change. Some commentators have speculated, however, that the
increase in suits filed during the 1990s was attributable to an increase in the
proportion of frivolous or non-meritorious suits, particularly those suits
involving prisoners."'
1980-2000 report included prison conditions suits. Finally, I added the non-prisoner-initiated and
prisoner-initiated numbers together to obtain the total number of civil rights claims.
110. See Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, §§ 801-810, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996);
42 U.S.C. § 1997e (codification of exhaustion requirement).
111. See, e.g., Margo Schlanger, Inmate Litigation, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1555, 1594 (2003)
(explaining that 82% of inmate litigation from 1980 to 1995 resulted in judgment for the defendants,
and that inmate litigation comprised fifteen percent of the federal docket in 1995).
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Figure 5: Civil Rights Cases Commenced in District Court 1990-2007
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For the sake of argument, I will assume that more suits overall equates
to more frivolous suits. And an increase in the number of frivolous suits
might be linked to an increase in the percentage of claims in which the court
found that no constitutional violation occurred.
But even if this assumption is in fact true-a proposition on which I
express no opinion-it has not skewed the data for present purposes. Most
obviously, the increase in the overall number of suits, with its hypothesized
corresponding increase in the number of non-meritorious suits, peaked in
1996 and declined thereafter. But my data show a steady increase in the
number of constitutional rulings against plaintiffs during this period of
decline, from 46% during the pre-Saucier period in 1999-2001 to 71% in
2006-2007. If anything, therefore, the decline in rulings favorable to
plaintiffs has occurred despite this hypothesized decrease in the number of
non-meritorious suits.
More concretely, I base my conclusion that the overall composition of
civil rights cases on the federal docket has not skewed my results on the
similarity of the trends seen at the district court and appellate levels. Even if
a greater percentage of claims filed before the district court in recent years
are-for whatever reason-lacking in merit, such cases are unlikely to reach
the appellate level. First, such cases are less likely to be appealed.
Moreover, structures present at the appellate level mitigate the possibility
that a greater number of non-meritorious cases filed at the district court level
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will affect the appellate docket. Each circuit has a screening procedure
involving a team of staff attorneys to deal more expeditiously with non-
meritorious cases. 112 Although commentators have analyzed and critiqued
this screening process, 113 the important point, for my purposes here, is that
non-meritorious cases are likely to be weeded out before hearing by an
appellate panel and disposed of by summary disposition." 4  Given this
vetting process, it is improbable that the decline in rulings favorable to
plaintiffs revealed by my data is the byproduct of a greater percentage of
appellate courts' written decisions ruling on non-meritorious cases.
Political views of judges. One might also argue that courts' apparent
reluctance to avail themselves of the option of finding a violation but
granting immunity could stem from the much-discussed conservative trend
in the judiciary. '5 Ideally, one would test this possibility by attempting to
compare the results reached by conservative and liberal district court
judges. 16  But because (obviously) there is no database listing judges as
"liberal" or "conservative," the best available proxy for the political
ideology of a judge is the party of the president who appointed the judge.
112. U.S. Courts, Newsroom, Staff Attorney Offices Help Manage Rising Caseloads (Feb. 17,
2004), http://www.uscourts.gov/newsroom/stffattys.htm ("Core responsibilities vary among staff
attorney offices, but in each appeals court they include review of all appeals filed by prison inmates
without a lawyer's help. Screening such 'pro se' prisoner cases was the initial focus of staff attorney
offices when they were formally authorized and established by Congress in 1982."). The magnitude
of the staff attorneys' screening role is also acknowledged by judges. See, e.g., Alex Kozinski, The
Appearance of Propriety, LEGAL AFF., Jan.-Feb. 2005, at 19 (explaining that a team of seventy staff
attorneys processes about 40% of the cases in which the Ninth Circuit issues a merits ruling).
113. See, e.g., Penelope Pether, Sorcerers, Not Apprentices: How Judicial Clerks and Staff
Attorneys Impoverish U.S. Law, 39 ARIz. STATE L.J. 1 (2007).
114. None of the cases I examined on Westlaw fell into this category.
115. See, e.g., Robert A. Carp et al., The Voting Behavior of George W. Bush's Judges: How
Sharp a Turn to the Right?, in PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF AMERICAN POLITICS: CLASSIC AND
CONTEMPORARY READINGS 429, 438-41 (Samuel Kemell & Steven S. Smith eds., 3d ed. 2007)
(discussing evidence that federal judges appointed by George W. Bush are the most conservative in
modem history with respect to civil rights and liberties). Commentators debate the recency of this
conservative trend. See, e.g., STEVEN P. POWERS & STANLEY ROTHMAN, THE LEAST DANGEROUS
BRANCH? 28 (2002) (contending that the lower federal courts are a battleground between more
liberal Carter and Clinton appointees and more conservative judges appointed by Ronald Reagan,
George H.W. Bush, and George W. Bush); William P. Marshall, Constitutional Law as Political
Spoils, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 525, 530 (2005) (highlighting the Reagan Justice Department's efforts
to appoint conservative judges to the bench). I do not attempt to weigh in on this debate; rather, I
only wish to rule out the impact of political affiliation on the data I have accumulated.
116. I did not attempt to examine the effects of political affiliation on the results reached by three-
judge appellate panels. Such an inquiry would have entailed weighing the party of the president who
appointed all three judges, and measuring the multiplicity of factors affecting the personal interplay
between the judges would require its own theoretical modeling-a complex project beyond the
scope of this article.
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Using the Federal Judicial Center biographical database, I identified the
president who had appointed each judge who decided a case in my set. 17 I
then performed logistic regression to determine whether the trends I
identified remained when the political party of the appointing president was
taken into account. 1 18
The analysis demonstrated that the party of the appointing president did
not account for the trends I identified. When political affiliation was taken
into account, there was no statistically significant change in the percentage
of cases in which courts held that there was a constitutional violation but
granted qualified immunity. There was a statistically significant increase in
the percentage of cases in which courts denied that a constitutional violation
had occurred. And there was a corresponding statistically significant
decrease in the percentage of cases where courts avoided the constitutional
question.
For readers less versed in statistics, Figure 6 offers a visual
demonstration of the minimal impact of political affiliation. The visible
similarity in the bar graphs for Democratic and Republican appointees for
each time period helps to illustrate that the two groups decided cases in a
quite similar fashion during all three time periods.
117. Federal Judicial Center, Biographical Directory of Federal Judges, http://www.fjc.gov/public/
home.nsf/hisj (last visited March 24, 2009). A few cases were decided by magistrate judges, who
are not politically appointed. These cases were not included in the statistical analysis.
118. Regression analysis was appropriate because time functioned as a continuous independent
variable in the analysis. Logistic regression, rather than standard regression, was necessary because
the values in question were percentages. I used the statistical software R to perform the logistic
regression. The full results of that analysis are available at Nancy Leong, http://nancyleong.com/the-
saucier-qualified-immunity-experiment-an-empirical-analysis-36-pepperdine-law-review-66724/
(last visited Apr. 13, 2009).
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The results demonstrate that members of both parties were uniformly
reluctant to hold that a violation had taken place, yet grant immunity. There
were more claims decided by Republican appointees in the pre-Siegert and
2006-2007 time frames (72 to 33 and 78 to 62, respectively), but more
claims decided by Democratic appointees in the pre-Saucier time frame (65
to 36). The shifting majority is unsurprising given that the pre-Saucier time
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frame fell near the end of a Democratic presidential administration, while
the other time frames followed Republican administrations. But the fact that
the identified trends persisted despite the change in the political makeup of
the judiciary indicates that political appointment had little to do with those
trends. Moreover, there were several instances of judicial behavior that were
ideologically counterintuitive. Stereotypically, Republican appointees are
more reluctant to acknowledge constitutional rights for plaintiffs, yet
Republican appointees were actually more likely than their Democratic
counterparts to find a constitutional violation yet grant immunity in the pre-
Siegert and pre-Saucier time periods (although the disparity was not
statistically significant). In short, the alleged conservative trend in thejudiciary does not appear to have had an impact on the consequences of
mandatory sequencing.
Westlaw and publication practices. Aside from the external factors
discussed above, I wish to discuss a few potential issues with the data set
itself. These issues result from the arbitrary manner in which cases are
selected for publication and the way Westlaw selects cases for inclusion.
According to the most recent available data, federal district court judges
decide to publish only one or two out of every ten opinions," 9 and appellate
courts also publish less than 20% of their opinions. 120  The movement
toward limited publication began in 1964, when the Judicial Conference of
the United States noted that the increasing number of published opinions
burdened the resources of law libraries. 121 According to the 1973 Advisory
Council for Appellate Justice Report formal guidelines, which govern both
federal district and appellate courts:
An opinion should be published if it does any one of the following:
(1) "lays down a new rule of law, or alters or modifies an existing
rule"; (2) "involves a legal issue of continuing public interest,"
rather than "general public interest of a fleeting nature"; (3)
"criticizes existing law," especially calling for change by a higher
court or legislature; or (4) resolves a conflict of authority and
"rationalizes apparent divergences in the way an existing rule has
been applied." 122
119. See, e.g., Karen Swenson, Federal District Court Judges and the Decision to Publish, 25JUST. SYS. J. 121 (2004); Stephen L. Wasby, Unpublished Court of Appeals Decisions: A Hard Look
at the Process, 14 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 67 (2004).
120. See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 2006 JUDICIAL FACTS AND FIGURES tbl. 2.5,
available at http://www.uscourts.gov/judicialfactsfigures/2006/alljudicialfactsfigures.pdf (noting
that only 18.4% of cases were published in 2005).
121. Swenson, supra note 119, at 121.
122. Id.
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Different jurisdictions, however, have markedly different practices with
respect to publication, publishing anywhere from 10% to slightly over half
of their decisions. 123  The first complication, therefore, arises because
Westlaw ties inclusion in its database to publication: it includes all published
opinions and only some unpublished ones. Consequently, the fact that some
jurisdictions publish at higher rates than others may lead to
overrepresentation of those jurisdictions in the database.
An additional complexity arises as a result of Westlaw's inclusion
practices with respect to unpublished opinions. For some jurisdictions,
Westlaw includes all unpublished opinions; for others, only a percentage of
those opinions. 124 The process by which Westlaw determines which
opinions to include is opaque and, apparently, somewhat arbitrary.125 The
different rates of inclusion for different jurisdictions thus create another
potential opportunity for the data set to become skewed.
Though these complications limit the use of Westlaw for some purposes,
further analysis of my data shows that any such limitation does not affect my
results. Similar to the analysis for political affiliation, I divided the claims
within each time period into "published" and "unpublished" categories and
performed logistic regression. The analysis demonstrated that changes in the
percentage of published cases did not account for the trends I identified.
When publication was taken into account, all the identified trends remained
present: There was no statistically significant change in the percentage of
cases in which courts held that there was a constitutional violation but
granted qualified immunity. There was a statistically significant increase in
the percentage of cases in which courts denied that a constitutional violation
had occurred. And there was a corresponding statistically significant
decrease in the percentage of cases in which courts avoided the
constitutional question.
Combined factors. Finally, I used logistic regression to determine
whether political ideology and publication together would account for the
123. Wasby, supra note 119, at 69.
124. For example, the database of federal district court cases on Westlaw includes all published
opinions as well as unpublished cases for the following jurisdictions: Northern District of Illinois
(since April 1985); Eastern District of Louisiana (since September 1986); District of Massachusetts
(since September 1986); Eastern District of New York (since September 1986); Southern District of
New York (since May 1984); Eastern District of Pennsylvania (since September 1985); District of
Kansas (since November 1988); District of the District of Columbia (since July 1990); Northern
District of California (since March 1993); Northern District of Mississippi (since June 1996); and
Northern District of Texas (since January 1997).
125. Interview with Robert Blackstone, Westlaw representative (Jan. 15, 2008) (notes on file with
author).
trend I observed. Once again, even when both political ideology and
publication were taken into account, the trends I identified persisted: no
statistically significant change in the percentage of cases in which courts
held there was a constitutional violation, a statistically significant increase in
the percentage of cases in which courts denied that a constitutional violation
had occurred, and a statistically significant decrease in the percentage of
cases in which courts engaged in avoidance.
Thus, having considered an array of potential problems, I conclude that
none of the variables I have discussed accounts for the trend I have
identified. The lack of plausible alternative explanations therefore supports
the conclusion that, in the qualified immunity context, some feature of the
sequencing approach itself accounts for the simultaneous decrease in
avoidance and increase in the denial of constitutional rights. In the next
section, I will offer a few thoughts about why sequencing accounts for this
decidedly one-sided trend.
V. EXPLANATIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
Sequencing has altered the course of the constitutional river. Judges aredeciding cases in a way that they would not have done but for Saucier.
Rather than avoid the constitutional question and grant qualified immunity
based on lack of clearly established law, courts are now articulating new
constitutional law. But these new statements of law are not those we might
have predicted. The original rationale for sequencing was to allow injured
plaintiffs to recover-as Justice Scalia explained, the purpose "is to clarify
the law and thus make unavailable repeated claims of qualified immunity in
future cases."' 126  But no increase in recovery by injured plaintiffs has
occurred. Rather, the data suggest that the new constitutional principles that
would not have been articulated but for the sequencing requirement
overwhelmingly favor government defendants.
This lopsided result invites speculation about the complexities ofjudicial behavior. I will therefore offer a few thoughts, bolstered by relevant
research from the field of cognitive psychology, in the hope that future
scholarship will further illuminate the shadowy realms of judges' decision
making processes in this area.
The theory of cognitive dissonance, described as "one of the most
influential theories in social psychology, ' 12 7 provides a compelling
explanation for judges' demonstrated reluctance to acknowledge a
126. Bunting v. Mellen, 541 U.S. 1019, 1024 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari).
127. Eddie Harmon-Jones & Judson Mills, An Introduction to Cognitive Dissonance Theory and
an Overview of Current Perspectives on the Theory, in COGNITIVE DISSONANCE: PROGRESS ON A
PIVOTAL THEORY IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 3 (Eddie Harmon-Jones & Judson Mills, eds., 1999).
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constitutional violation but grant qualified immunity. Cognitive dissonance
is the feeling of discomfort that results from holding two contradictory or
inconsistent ideas simultaneously, which produces a drive to reduce the
dissonance by modifying or rejecting one of the inconsistent ideas. 128 Leon
Festinger, the pioneer of cognitive dissonance theory, offers the example of
an individual who continues to smoke, knowing that it is bad for his
health. 2 9 That individual may reconcile this inconsistency by deciding:
(a) he enjoys smoking so much it is worth it; (b) the chances of his
health suffering are not as serious as some would make out; (c) he
can't always avoid every possible dangerous contingency and still
live; and (d) perhaps even if he stopped smoking he would put on
weight which is equally bad for his health. 
130
The existence of a dissonant state, therefore, leads individuals to seek or
accept information that reduces dissonance, while discounting evidence that
increases dissonance by ignoring, discrediting, or denying 
it. 131
Subsequent studies about the factors that influence dissonance suggest
that judges are likely to experience dissonance more acutely than members
of the general population.'32  Judges, in other words, have unique and
powerful incentives to avoid dissonance wherever possible. Research
indicates that the drive to reduce cognitive dissonance is particularly strong
when individuals are publicly and irrevocably committed to a position they
have adopted. 133 This research undoubtedly applies to judges, whose written
opinions are enshrined for all to read in print reporters and online databases.
Likewise, the drive to reduce cognitive dissonance inheres in a decision only
when that decision is made freely. 134 Research has found, for example, that
128. LEON FESTINGER, A THEORY OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE 128-29 (1957).
129. Id. at 2.
130. Id.
131. See id. at 3 ("When dissonance is present, in addition to trying to reduce it, the person will
actively avoid situations and information which would likely increase the dissonance.").
132. While a comprehensive survey of cognitive dissonance research is unnecessary for the
general conclusions presented in this paper, two useful resources that offer up-to-date overviews of
the field are COGNITIVE DISSONANCE: PROGRESS ON A PIVOTAL THEORY IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY,
supra note 127, and JOEL COOPER, COGNITIVE DISSONANCE: FIFTY YEARS OF A CLASSIC THEORY
(2007).
133. See, e.g., J. Merrill Carlsmith et al., Studies in Forced Compliance, 4 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 1 (1966); Keith E. Davis & Edward E. Jones, Changes in Interpersonal Perception as a
Means of Reducing Cognitive Dissonance, 61 J. ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCHOL. 402 (1960).
134. See, e.g., Darwyn E. Linder et al., Decision Freedom as a Determinant of the Role of
Incentive Magnitude in Attitude Change, 6 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 245 (1967).
students who chose to participate in an experiment experienced a great deal
more dissonance (and correspondingly changed their attitudes to reduce that
dissonance) when asked to write essays that conflicted with their beliefs than
those who were required to participate in the same experiment. 135 It is likely
that those who participated voluntarily felt more responsible for their own
behavior. As Professor Cooper emphasizes, "[c]hoice matters,"'136 andjudges, with their lifetime tenure and broad discretion, exercise virtually
unfettered choice. This freedom to choose the outcome of a case, and the
responsibility that accompanies such a choice, initiates a powerful
compulsion to reduce dissonance resulting from that choice.
Cognitive dissonance theory offers a compelling explanation for the
lopsidedness of constitutional law articulation after Saucier. 137 As we have
seen, even before Siegert, judges were reluctant to acknowledge a violation
but deny recovery on immunity grounds. From the perspective of
dissonance theory, such reluctance is expected. Our legal culture is steeped
in the principle that "where there is a right, there must be a remedy."' 3 8 The
act of recognizing a right, yet precluding a remedy, could create cognitive
dissonance for many judges, whose education, training, and even moral
inclination encourage them to ensure that rights and remedies remain linked.
Such dissonance is only compounded by the fact that it is a constitutional
right that would be recognized, and a judge-made mechanism that would
preclude entitlement to a remedy. Acknowledging a constitutional injury
while precluding recovery may therefore create intense internal discomfort
for judges. Rather than tolerate this cognitive dissonance, judges may be
subconsciously inclined to deny that a constitutional violation occurred at
all.
Other jurisprudential conventions also induce judges to avoid cognitive
dissonance by denying the existence of constitutional rights. The notion of
reliance on precedent is deeply ingrained in-indeed, integral to-our
common law legal system. But granting immunity to a defendant officer
tends to undermine the plausibility of holding that a constitutional violation
occurred. The act of acknowledging that no court has previously held that a
constitutional violation exists under the circumstances entails
135. Id.
136. COOPER, supra note 132, at 63.
137. Festinger seems almost to have directly contemplated judicial decision making, explaining
that "[w]here an opinion must be formed or a decision taken, some dissonance is almost unavoidably
created." FESTINGER, supra note 128, at 5.
138. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 162-63 (1803) (citing WILLIAMBLACKSTONE, 3 COMMENTARIES *23, $109); Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law,
Non-Retroactivity, and Constitutional Remedies, 104 HARv. L. REv. 1733, 1778 & n.243 (1991)(summarizing the establishment of the principle that, where there is a law, there is a remedy and
explaining that this principle is a cornerstone of the American legal tradition).
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acknowledging the lack of precedent for what the court is about to do.1
39
The inherent reasonableness of a decision is also a well-recognized precept,
one not casually ignored. For a defendant officer to be held liable, "the
contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official
would understand that what he is doing violates that right."'' 40  By
recognizing a constitutional violation but granting qualified immunity, a
court must concede (at least implicitly) that it is reaching a result that a
reasonable officer would not have predicted.' 4' The judiciary has recently
faced accusations of so-called judicial activism, and in light of these charges,
judges may be especially wary of reaching a result that appears to go out on
a limb or create new law. 142
In the few cases where judges have recognized a constitutional right
while granting qualified immunity to the officers who violated that right, the
decision was often justified by some additional factor, such as novel factual
circumstances or previously-unaddressed technology. The Supreme Court,
for instance, has found a constitutional violation, yet granted immunity, on
only one occasion. In Wilson v. Layne, the Court held that officers who
entered a private residence to execute an arrest warrant violated the Fourth
Amendment when they brought a newspaper reporter and a photographer
with them. 43  But concluding that the constitutional question "is by no
means open and shut," the Court then granted immunity to the police
officers.'" Wilson is notable for the novelty of its factual circumstances.
Indeed, the Court identified only one published state intermediate court
139. The Supreme Court has held that "clearly establish[ing]" legal principles sufficient to
preclude qualified immunity requires on-point caselaw from the Supreme Court, controlling
authority in the relevant jurisdiction, or a "consensus of cases of persuasive authority." Wilson v.
Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 617 (1999). A court might therefore be able to buttress its argument using
persuasive authority that fell short of a consensus or non-persuasive authority such as district court
opinions. The use of such authority, however, might also signal the lack of stronger authority,
thereby highlighting, rather than downplaying, the uniqueness of the court's result.
140. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987).
141. See Amanda K. Eaton, Note, Optical Illusions: The Hazy Contours of the Clearly Established
Law and the Effects of Hope v. Pelzer on the Qualified Immunity Doctrine, 38 GA. L. REv. 661,
696-702 (2004) (advocating increased emphasis on the reasonableness of the officer's actions in
determining qualified immunity).
142. See Keenan D. Kmiec, The Origin and Current Meanings of "JudicialActivism," 92 CAL. L.
REv. 1441, 1442 (2004) (noting that the term has been discussed in over five thousand law review
articles); id. at 1443 n.8 ("In the past decade (from 1994 to August 2004), 'judicial activism' and its
cognates have appeared 163 times in the Washington Post and another 135 times in the New York
Times.").
143. 526 U.S. at 605-06.
144. Id. at 615-16.
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decision that dealt with the same issue. 145 Given such novelty, the Justices
likely experienced less dissonance in finding a constitutional violation but
granting immunity: the lack of precedent was simply a function of the new
factual scenario, and the fact that reasonable officers failed to anticipate the
decision could also be explained by the lack of prior guidance.
Cognitive dissonance theory also accounts for the direction in which the
constitutional issues that courts avoided pre-Saucier are resolved. One
might contend that judges could also reduce dissonance by recognizing a
constitutional violation and denying immunity. But as discussed in Part III,
empirical evidence suggests that the proportion of cases in which courts
deny qualified immunity has, if anything, decreased. 146  Why does this
denial of violations predominate?
Festinger termed the process of resolving dissonance "psychological
work," explaining that such work will typically result in support of the
cognition most resistant to change. 147 Here, the relevant subset of cases
consists of those where previously courts would have avoided the
constitutional question and simply granted immunity. It is a reasonable
assumption that, within this set of cases, the immunity question is generally
easy and the constitutional question difficult. Judges, therefore, are likely to
have a clear intuition about the outcome of the immunity question. The
greater level of certainty regarding the immunity determination makes the
outcome on that issue, the cognition, more resistant to change. Under such
circumstances, acknowledging a constitutional violation will inevitably
intensify, rather than resolve, cognitive dissonance. Judges, it stands to
reason, will instead lessen or avoid cognitive dissonance by denying that a
constitutional violation occurred.
Aside from the relative ease of the immunity determination in avoidance
cases, other facets of qualified immunity jurisprudence also explain why
dissonance is generally resolved in favor of the defendant. The Supreme
Court has instructed that the qualified immunity issue should be resolved as
early as possible in litigation 141-perhaps even on a motion to dismiss,
before the plaintiff has had ample opportunity for discovery. This emphasis
on early resolution means that these issues generally arise on the defendant's
motion for dismissal or summary judgment on immunity grounds. The
145. Id. at 616.
146. See Appendix infra tbls. 3 & 4.
147. In Festinger's words: "[T]here is a limit to the magnitude of dissonance which can exist in a
system .... If the dissonance becomes greater than the resistance to change, then the least resistant
elements of cognition will be changed, thus reducing the dissonance." FESTINGER, supra note 128,
at 128-29.
148. See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200 (2001); see, e.g., Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227(1991) (per curiam) ("[W]e repeatedly have stressed the importance of resolving immunity questions
at the earliest possible stage in litigation.").
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court's initial focus, therefore, is on whether the defendant deserves
immunity-not on the possibility that a constitutional violation occurred.
This initial focus inevitably privileges the defendant's narrative. "9 As
Professor Nahmod has explained, the judge makes the objective
reasonableness determination "by reading the defendant's particularized
narrative and imagining what it was like when she acted as she did under the
circumstances confronting her."'' 50  And once the immunity question has
been decided in favor of the defendant, cognitive dissonance theory suggests
that the constitutional issue is likely to be decided the same way.
One might expect that the Supreme Court would be less concerned
about the implications of acknowledging a constitutional violation but
granting qualified immunity. The Court has an inherent lawmaking
function-indeed, grants of certiorari are often prompted by circuit splits,
which by definition indicate a lack of clarity in the law, and so the Court is
more accustomed to reaching the result it deems most appropriate where the
law is unclear. The Supreme Court's role thus contrasts with that of the
lower courts, whose responsibilities involve a mixture of articulating law
and applying existing legal principles. Moreover, the Supreme Court is
likely less concerned with lack of precedent for its result than are lower
courts. Its decisions run no risk of being overturned, and no real
consequences (aside, perhaps, from public excoriation) flow from reaching a
result that is only minimally supported by precedent. But, as noted, even the
Supreme Court has found a constitutional violation yet granted immunity
only once, in Wilson v. Layne, where the novelty of the factual
circumstances likely resulted in less dissonance for the Justices. 151
The question remains: why should we care about the increased
articulation of defendant-friendly law after Saucier? The sequencing
approach is still functioning to articulate constitutional law, however
unilaterally, thereby placing government officers and members of the public
on notice of the relevant legal standards. But the forced articulation of
constitutional principles has implications over time. When a court answers a
constitutional question rather than saving that question for another day, it
creates a new legal principle. In the process, the court recenters the legal
149. Sheldon Nahmod, The Restructuring of Narrative and Empathy in Section 1983 Cases, 72
CHI.-KENT L. REv. 819, 827-32 (1997) ("As a practical matter... the plaintiff's story is typically
narrated in a barebones fashion .... And it is this barely told story, not fleshed out, that competes
with the defendant's more elaborate and evidentiary narrative articulated in the qualified immunity
setting.").
150. Id. at 828-29.
15 1. See supra text accompanying notes 141-143.
regime in that area, altering expectations and changing the legal landscape
for all future claims. 152  Professor Healy has described this process as a
"domino effect," noting that "a ruling that a constitutional right does not
exist authorizes government officials to engage in conduct they otherwise
might have avoided."'
15 3
In the Fourth Amendment context, for example, police officers in most
jurisdictions are trained that various restraint techniques are arrayed along a
"continuum of force," with more severe uses of force appropriate only in
more dangerous situations. 15 4 Consequently, a decision upholding the use of
a particular technique-say, pepper spray-to physically subdue a
recalcitrant suspect recenters the continuum, leading the judiciary,
government officers, and the general public to view that technique as more
acceptable. 155  In a future case involving a slightly more dangerous
technique-a taser, perhaps 156-the question will not be decided on a blank
slate, but will be decided in light of the previous case. But the previous case
would not have been decided but for Saucier's sequencing requirement.
Cognitive psychology offers a compelling explanation for the trend in
law articulated as a result of Saucier. Regardless of the underlying
mechanisms at work, however, the ensuing slow shift in the law over time
raises serious concerns regarding the interplay between the sequencing
approach and the articulation of constitutional law in the qualified immunity
context. Under such circumstances, continued adherence to Saucier's
mandate was inadvisable, and the Supreme Court thus correctly held in
Pearson that sequencing take place at the court's discretion.
152. Indeed, even attorneys may cite unpublished appellate cases in their briefs for their
precedential or persuasive value in all but three circuits (the Second, Seventh, and Ninth). See
ROBERT TIMOTHY REAGAN, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., CITING UNPUBLISHED FEDERAL APPELLATE
OPINIONS ISSUED BEFORE 2007 (2007), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Unpub-
Opinions.pdf. Courts, of course, may discuss or rely on any authority, published or unpublished,
they find relevant and persuasive.
153. Healy, supra note 10, at 933.
154. See, e.g., Griffith v. Coburn, 473 F.3d 650, 657 (6th Cir. 2007) ("Police tactics are classified
along a 'force continuum' and ... the vascular neck restraint falls toward 'the harder or the more
violent part' of this continuum, probably beyond pepper spray, at the 'point where you are using
batons, or... tasers.'"); Jennings v. Jones, 499 F.3d 2, 12 (lst Cir. 2007) (explaining that various
techniques for subduing and restraining an arrestee are placed along a "Use of Force Continuum").
155. See Mecham v. Frazier, 500 F.3d 1200 (10th Cir. 2007) (holding to be constitutional the use
of pepper spray during a roadside stop after a female detainee took a cell phone call from her
mother, refused to terminate the call on a police officer's command, and indicated that she did not
wish to exit the car until her mother arrived because she was afraid of what the police officers would
do if she exited the car).
156. See Griffith, 473 F.3d. at 657; see also Covington v. Fairman, 123 F. App'x 738, 743 (9th
Cir. 2004) (indicating that pepper spray is a less extreme use of force than is a taser).
[Vol. 36: 667, 2009] The Saucier Qualified Immunity Experiment
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
VI. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
After eight years of debate, the Supreme Court has now rejected
Saucier's holding that the sequencing approach should be mandatory. The
empirical evidence presented in this article, and the long-term skew in the
law that would result from continued mandatory sequencing, add support for
the result the Court reached.
The Supreme Court revised Saucier by allowing courts to undertake
sequencing at their discretion rather than at the Supreme Court's mandate.
But it offered little guidance as to when courts should exercise that
discretion. In my view, discretion need not and should not be arbitrary.
Rather, the decision to decide the constitutional question should result from
thoughtful assessment of two relevant factors: whether the constitutional
issue is likely to be repeated without ever becoming more susceptible to
review and whether the issue is adequately presented in the particular case,
taking account of the procedural posture of the case, the corresponding
thoroughness of the parties' briefing of the constitutional issue, and the level
of factual development. If the constitutional question is unlikely to arise in a
more appropriate posture for resolution, and the issue is adequately
presented and briefed in the case at hand, then the court could proceed to
rule on the constitutional issue. Otherwise, it could simply resolve the
matter on qualified immunity grounds, saving the constitutional question for
another day. Such an approach would at least partially address the concerns
of those who argue that constitutional law will otherwise fail to evolve. But
it would also avoid the forced articulation of constitutional law-and
subsequent skew toward denial of constitutional rights--engendered by
Saucier's mandatory sequencing approach.
Despite the Court's decision to end the "Saucier experiment," we should
remain mindful that the new approach it has prescribed has simply replaced
that experiment with another. The goal of the new experiment is, as always,
to balance the need to facilitate the development of the law with pragmatic
concerns such as judicial economy and informed judicial decision making.
And the success or failure of the new experiment inherently hinges on real-
world results, which must be assessed through the collection and analysis of
empirical data. My ultimate hope, therefore, is that subsequent research will
continue to monitor the effect of qualified immunity doctrine on the
evolution of the law by examining the nature and quality of the law the
doctrine facilitates. This article, then, is only the first stage of what must be
an ongoing process of evaluating the procedures we espouse by examining
the law those procedures produce.
Appendix: Numerical Tables Corresponding to Charts and Graphs
Table 1: District court claims where the defendant(s) prevailed
Pre-
Siegert
28.6 65.7 (47.6 + 18.1)
Pre- 106 20.8 7.6 71.7 (51.9 + 19.8)
Saucier
2006- 156 6.4 4.5 89.1 (69.9 + 19.2)
2007
Table 2: Appellate court claims where the defendant(s) prevailed
Pre-
Siegert
46.2 (31.1 + 15.1)
Pre- 110 29.1 1.8 69.1 (62.7+6.4)
Saucier
2006- 113 6.2 8.8 84.9 (80.5 + 4.4)
2007
157. For an explanation of the numbers in parentheses, see supra note 100.
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Table 3: All district court claims
Table 4: All appellate court claims
34.0 (22.9 +11.1)
Pre- 144 22.2 1.4 52.8 (47.9 + 20.1 3.5
Saucier 4.9)
2006- 155 4.5 6.5 61.9 (58.7 + 26.5 0.7
2007 3.2)
158. For a description of this category, see supra Part IV.A.
Table 5: District court results by political party of appointing president
Pre-
Siegert
-D
48.0 (36.5 +
11.5)
Pre- 68.1 20.7 4.5 39.6 (27.9 + 31.5 3.6
Siegert 11.7)
-R
Pre- 46.7 18.2 4.0 33.8 (19.5 + 44.2 0.0
Saucier 14.3)
-D
Pre- 49.7 7.3 6.1 57.3 (45.1 + 23.2 6.1
Saucier 12.2)
-R
2006- 39.0 9.2 5.3 67.1 (55.3 + 7.9 10.5
2007 - 11.8)
D
2006- 51.3 2.0 2.0 74.0 (54.0 + 19.0 3.0
2007 - 20.0)
R
159. For the pre-Saucier and 2006-2007 time periods, the percentages do not add up to one
hundred because a few decisions were made by magistrate judges, who are not politically appointed
and whose political affiliation is therefore not known.
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Table 6: Civil rights cases commenced in district court 1990-2007
1990 18,914 25,992 44,906
1991 19,892 26,042 45,934
1992 24,233 30,555 54,788
1993 27,655 33,933 61,588
1994 32,622 39,065 71,687
1995 36,600 41,679 78,279
1996 42,007 41,215 83,222
1997 43,278 28,632 71,910
1998 42,354 26,461 68,815
1999 41,304 25,694 66,998
2000 40,908 25,504 66,412
2001 40,910 24,118 65,028
2002 40,420 23,964 64,384
2003 40,516 24,073 64,589
2004 40,239 23,449 63,688
2005 36,096 24,614 60,710
2006 32,865 24,239 57,104
2007 31,756 24,025 55,781
Table 7: Published district and appellate court claims
Table 8: Unpublished district and appellate court claims
44.0Pre-
Siegert
Pre- 23.1 47.6 3.1 24.4 1.9
Saucier
2006- 3.9 69.5 3.5 19.5 3.5
2007
